[e2e] 0% NAT - checkmating the disconnectors

Tom Vest tvest at pch.net
Mon Mar 13 09:03:05 PST 2006


Hi Dah Ming,

Forgive me for belaboring the obvious, but IP transit services have  
to be delivered/terminated somewhere, and many of the world's  
"somewheres" are characterized by IP transit options that are highly  
constrained by non-economic factors that are not very sensitive to  
economic pressures. Over time, some of these places do seem to  
respond to ecological pressures (i.e., would-be local operators shift  
production out to more favorable local environments, causing  
exaggerated differential growth rates), but the transit-constrained  
localities are often the very same places where exit is also  
vigorously discouraged.

Or so it seems to me...

Tom

On Mar 13, 2006, at 11:29 AM, Dah Ming Chiu wrote:

> I have only read the last 2-3 posts of this thread - interesting  
> discussion.
> What puzzles me is why it is necessary to have such a "social compact"
> to ensure global transit. Isn't market forces strong enough to  
> guarantee
> connectivity?  In other words, if you are an ISP preferring to  
> limit transit,
> maybe some of your customers will find other transit providers?  Of  
> course,
> at some levels, when there is monopoly, there still needs to be  
> government
> regulations.
>
> DMC
>
> ----- Original Message ----- From: "David P. Reed" <dpreed at reed.com>
> To: "David P. Reed" <dpreed at reed.com>
> Cc: <end2end-interest at postel.org>
> Sent: Monday, March 13, 2006 10:40 PM
> Subject: Re: [e2e] 0% NAT - checkmating the disconnectors
>
>
>> Note that in the commentary about "social compacts" below I was  
>> making an analogy between the Internet compact and the AT&T- 
>> USGovt.  compact.   This analogy is, of course, limited.   In  
>> particular the counterparties of the Internet compact are the set  
>> of all other Internet participants, not the government.   The  
>> Internet is not an entity that fits within the jurisdiction of the  
>> US Govt.   It transcends that boundary by its very nature as a  
>> framework for cooperation.  Similarly English language culture  
>> transcends the US Government (though the French seem to think they  
>> define the French language by governmental fiat).
>>
>> David P. Reed wrote:
>>>
>>> Greg Skinner wrote:
>>>> I went back and reread Saikat's paper.  I did not view his  
>>>> remarks in
>>>> the light that you seem to.  I read them as "a network operator  
>>>> would
>>>> like to protect his network from abuse, and enable its authorized
>>>> users to freely communicate."
>>>>
>>> I did not read the following paragraph from Saikat's email that way:
>>>> Is there a way to architect the Internet to give the network  
>>>> operator
>>>> full control over his network? So, when his boss (who paid for  
>>>> the wires
>>>> and routers) asks him to block application X, he can do just  
>>>> that and
>>>> not cause the collateral damage that firewall-hacks cause today.
>>>>
>>> It's important to realize that the Hushaphone decision was argued  
>>> (and won) on the basis that AT&T's claim that ANY application  
>>> they didn't like had a risk of "damaging" the network, which was  
>>> demonstrably owned by AT&T.   So there is a plausible (but  
>>> outlandish) risk that any user action can damage the network  
>>> (even attaching a piece of plastic to the phone handset!)
>>>
>>> The resolution of Carterfone was not based on a demonstration the  
>>> there was NO risk to the network from attached devices.   It was  
>>> based on AT&T abusing its social contract with the US Government,  
>>> whereby the government acknowledged a de facto monopoly, in  
>>> exchange for a variety of public goods that it promised (such as  
>>> investing in and deploying new technology via Bell Labs) and its  
>>> failure to deliver those public goods.
>>>
>>> The same deal exists in the implicit Internet Compact (such as it  
>>> is) - if you offer to carry IP traffic, you offer to carry all of  
>>> it, just as all other AS's do.   Subject of course to making  
>>> yourself a target of directed attacks that are in fact real.    
>>> The Internet as a whole aids each other in finding and fixing  
>>> such problems.   Unilateral behavior leads to balkanization, and  
>>> at that point there is no Internet.
>>>
>>>
>



More information about the end2end-interest mailing list