[e2e] 0% NAT - checkmating the disconnectors

[David P. Reed]

Note that in the commentary about "social compacts" below I was making 
an analogy between the Internet compact and the AT&T-USGovt.  compact.   
This analogy is, of course, limited.   In particular the counterparties 
of the Internet compact are the set of all other Internet participants, 
not the government.   The Internet is not an entity that fits within the 
jurisdiction of the US Govt.   It transcends that boundary by its very 
nature as a framework for cooperation.  Similarly English language 
culture transcends the US Government (though the French seem to think 
they define the French language by governmental fiat).

David P. Reed wrote:
>
> Greg Skinner wrote:
>> I went back and reread Saikat's paper.  I did not view his remarks in
>> the light that you seem to.  I read them as "a network operator would
>> like to protect his network from abuse, and enable its authorized
>> users to freely communicate."
>>   
> I did not read the following paragraph from Saikat's email that way:
>> Is there a way to architect the Internet to give the network operator
>> full control over his network? So, when his boss (who paid for the wires
>> and routers) asks him to block application X, he can do just that and
>> not cause the collateral damage that firewall-hacks cause today.
>>   
> It's important to realize that the Hushaphone decision was argued (and 
> won) on the basis that AT&T's claim that ANY application they didn't 
> like had a risk of "damaging" the network, which was demonstrably 
> owned by AT&T.   So there is a plausible (but outlandish) risk that 
> any user action can damage the network (even attaching a piece of 
> plastic to the phone handset!)
>
> The resolution of Carterfone was not based on a demonstration the 
> there was NO risk to the network from attached devices.   It was based 
> on AT&T abusing its social contract with the US Government, whereby 
> the government acknowledged a de facto monopoly, in exchange for a 
> variety of public goods that it promised (such as investing in and 
> deploying new technology via Bell Labs) and its failure to deliver 
> those public goods.
>
> The same deal exists in the implicit Internet Compact (such as it is) 
> - if you offer to carry IP traffic, you offer to carry all of it, just 
> as all other AS's do.   Subject of course to making yourself a target 
> of directed attacks that are in fact real.   The Internet as a whole 
> aids each other in finding and fixing such problems.   Unilateral 
> behavior leads to balkanization, and at that point there is no Internet.
>
>
>